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Recently there has been a striking revival of what has been called virtue ethics: a 
kind of ethical theory whose basis is virtue and character, and which takes the primary 
ethical issue to be that of what kind of person I should aim to be.  In everyday life we 
have always cared about virtue, for we care about whether we and other people are 
brave or cowardly, generous or stingy. We care about the kind of people we are making 
ourselves into by the way we live our lives; we think that the question, what kind of life 
I am living and whether I should improve it, is centrally important to my life. For over a 
century these issues have been ignored by academic ethical philosophy, which has 
treated them either as falling below the level of theory or as issues that a proper ethical 
theory actually gets rid of. The issues went away for some time in academic ethical 
theory, but since theory is not magic they never went away in the real world; they have 
persisted in ordinary ethical discourse and elsewhere in the culture, in popular 
psychology and self-help books. Now they have for some time returned from exile back 
into ethical theory and we find exciting new debates about the kind of structure for 
ethical thinking that we need when issues of virtue and the good life move back into the 
center. 
There are many familiar objections to virtue ethics; I shall mention just a few of 
them. Virtue ethics, it is claimed, is too vague to tell us what to do; it is egoistic, and 
thus objectionable as a moral theory; it is morally conservative and it relies on a dubious 
notion of human nature. All these objections can, I am confident, be met, though not on 
this occasion. Recently, however, a new objection has been raised to virtue ethics, one 
which is quite fundamental, for if it turns out to have force then virtue ethics is in 
 1 
trouble and the more familiar kinds of objection would not even be necessary. It is this 
objection I will be discussing today.  
To construct a virtue ethics, we have to begin by answering the question, what is 
a virtue? We can come up with a few examples – courage, generosity and fairness are 
virtues. But what makes them virtues? A reasonable and intuitive answer is that a 
virtue is a disposition – a way I am as a matter of disposition and character.  This is 
common to most accounts of virtue. For if someone is generous, say, that is an aspect of 
his character, and that is just to say that it is true of him that he is generous – not just on 
occasion, but as a matter of disposition, across his life. Even otherwise thin accounts of 
virtue, such as Hume’s, make this point: a virtue is something stable and reliable. 
Virtues, then, are dispositions or what are called in psychology character traits. (Of 
course there is a lot more to be said about what virtues are, but this is the point most 
relevant to the current debate.)  
Recently some philosophers, using psychological research, have claimed that a 
dispositional, character trait account of virtue presupposes claims about our moral 
psychology which are false. We just don’t have dispositions or character traits of the 
kind the virtues would have to be. If so, then virtue ethics would be stymied at the very 
start, since it would rest on a false view of our psychology and what we are capable of. 
For we do take virtues to be dispositions in a substantial way. We see Jane act bravely 
on one occasion, say in rescuing a child from a dog. We think that Jane is brave, where 
this includes two thoughts: that Jane will continue to act bravely in this sort of situation 
(physical danger and risk), and that Jane will act bravely in a wide range of different 
situations where bravery may be called for. When, that is, we ascribe a virtue, we are 
ascribing a disposition which is robust, producing brave actions in a reliable way and 
one which is relevant to Jane’s life overall, and thus global.  
In everyday life, we often recognize that seeing Jane act in one type of situation is 
insufficient grounds for thinking her to be brave, period. The recent claim is that we are 
in worse shape than we think; our ascriptions of virtue and character are deeply in 
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error, as badly wrong as ‘folk physics’1. For when we explain why Jane performed an 
action, we ascribe too much to character and too little to the impact of the situation that 
she is in.  That we do this is explained by our making a variety of errors, notably the 
‘fundamental attribution error’, which lead us to ‘over-ascribe’ to the agent’s character 
what is better explained by the impact of the situation. Situationist psychologists claim 
that various experiments show that our actions are explained to a far greater extent than 
we believe by situations that we are in, sometimes features of situations of which we are 
not even aware. Here the infamous Milgram experiments are often referred to. Finding 
themselves in the situation of participating, as they thought, in a scientific experiment, 
the subjects did as they were told by the supposed scientists, even when told to do 
horrendous things. Whether they were compassionate people or not made no difference 
to all but a few. Another experiment often referred to2 is one in which an actor dropped 
papers in front of an unsuspecting subject who had just made a phone call. The subjects 
either helped, or not; whether or not they did correlated not with whether they were 
caring people or not, but only with whether there was a coin in the phone return slot. 
The case most commonly cited in this debate is an experiment3 where Princeton 
Theological Seminary students were put into the following situation. After answering a 
questionnaire about their reasons for studying theology, they prepared to give a lecture 
on the parable of the Good Samaritan. On their way they encountered an actor 
pretending to be in distress. The only constant in the ways they responded – by 
stopping to help or by hurrying past -was the degree to which they were in a hurry.  
Situationists who recount this experiment tend to use it to reinterpret the Good 
Samaritan parable itself, as showing that the problem with the priest and the Levite, 
                                                 
1 ‘The relation between lay personology and a more correct theory of personality is 
analogous to the relation between lay and scientific physics’ (Ross and Nisbett (1991), 
161; cf. 7-8. 
2 By Isen and Levin; it is referred to by both Harman and Doris. Miller (2004) followed 
up the subsequent psychological literature, where it emerges that when the experiment 
was repeated the results were wildly different. Doris (2002, p 180 n 4) dismisses this, in 
my view unsuccessfully.  
 3 
who passed by on the other side, was not that they were uncaring but that they were 
running late. So far I have not found anyone who takes this line of thought to its logical 
conclusion, namely that the intent of the parable is not to show us that our neighbour is 
anyone who needs our help, but to impress on us the importance of good time 
management. 
What is supposed to follow from these experiments as to the way we think of 
character traits, and in particular virtues? Social psychologists at first drew radical 
conclusions to the effect that our everyday discourse about character traits is radically 
wrong,4 and, rather later in the day, some philosophers have recently seized on the 
experiments to defend a thesis which has hostile implications for virtue ethics. I shall 
use ‘situationist’ to refer to philosophers who use the situationist psychologists’ work to 
attack virtue ethics, although I shall note differences between the most famous (or 
notorious) of them, Gilbert Harman and John Doris.5  Harman6 has claimed that the 
experiments show that there are no character traits. Scientists, he claims, have shown 
that we attribute character on the basis of actions which are in fact explained by the 
impact of situations; this is an error, since different situations produce different 
behaviour, while a character trait should have produced uniform behaviour. So, since 
(he assumes) this erroneous attribution is our only ground for ascribing character traits, 
we should conclude that there are none. Aggressively, he claims that ‘we’ (whoever 
‘we’ are) should stop ‘people’ (other people presumably) talking in terms of virtue 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 By Darley and Batson, referred to very frequently.  
4 The debate in psychology, however, has largely settled down, and psychologists no 
longer draw melodramatic conclusions from the experimental material. See Gilbert 
(1995), Clarke (forthcoming). 
5 Less noticed in the debate is the article by Campbell (1999), which is more tentative in 
its conclusions.  
6 Harman (1999), (2000), (2001), where the thesis is stated in increasingly sweeping 
terms. In (2003) Harman seems to defend a weaker thesis more like that of Doris. 
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altogether. This refusal to talk about character traits at all renders serious debate with 
virtue ethics impossible7. 
A less extreme view has been defended by John Doris.8 Doris claims that the 
psychology experiments undermine our everyday belief that people have global 
character traits, including the virtues. We think that Jane who bravely rescues the child 
from the dog will be reliably brave in a variety of different kinds of situation; but this is, 
he claims, defeated by the psychologists’ experiments, which show that our response is 
caused in large part by the kind of situation we are in, even when we fail to recognize 
this. The thesis that we have global character traits, including the virtues, is, he claims, 
‘empirically inadequate’: all but a few people fail to act in ways that we predict they 
would, if they had global traits. If we are in familiar, repeated situations, then we can 
build up a local trait of acting in a certain way, but these traits do not have ‘cross-
situational consistency’; if we predict that people will act consistently with that trait in a 
different situation, most people will let us down.  
So we might have local traits, which are encouraged by repeatable situations. 
Many of the Princeton students, for example, might be compassionate in leisurely 
situations where they had time to reflect, and were in the company of like-minded 
people. But in a situation which confronted them with a stranger when they were in a 
hurry they reacted differently. Thus they lacked a robust trait of compassion to 
motivate them across different types of situation; they were merely compassionate in 
leisurely situations, not in hurried ones. Doris concludes that we can have local traits, 
supported by repeated situations, but that the idea that we have global traits is a 
mistake, an over-attribution which fails to take account of the fact, dramatically shown 
                                                 
7 In his (2000) exchange with Athannasoulis, Harman simply repeats his claim that there 
are no character traits, ignoring pertinent objections to the idea that the experimental 
material warrants conclusions about character in particular. However, he claims that his 
view is consistent with very weak forms of virtue ethics such as are defended by Merritt 
(2000) and in the work of Judith Thomson (but since the latter talks only of actions it is 
not really a virtue form of theory).  
8 Doris (1998) and (2002). 
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up in the experiments, that people largely fail to act in consistent ways across different 
types of situation.  
If there are no global traits, there is no character as we think of that, namely as a 
(relatively) unified combination of traits. So virtue ethics, on this view, is further 
mistaken in thinking that we have (relatively) unified characters in the first place. 
Before we try to improve our characters by aiming to be brave, fair and so on, we 
should realize that there is no overall character to improve. Rather, our character is 
what Doris calls ‘fragmented’; I cannot count on the tendency I have developed to be 
brave in one kind of situation to carry over to others, where rather than continuing to be 
reinforced it might be undermined by features of the new situation, including features 
like being in a hurry, or being in a group of other people, or even features that I might 
not be aware of. My attitude to my own life has to become more a matter of strategy, 
seeking out or avoiding types of situation rather than relying on my having a unified 
character.  
Is virtue ethics in fact mistaken as to our psychology, wrong about the feasibility 
of our becoming virtuous? This is an objection which it is important to meet, especially 
since I allowed that, whatever the state of affairs in currently fashionable psychology, 
we do recognize that we are sometimes mistaken about character traits when we ascribe 
them on the basis of actions in one kind of situation alone.  
 
We certainly do take the virtues to be global traits. If we think that someone is 
compassionate, we think that he is compassionate over his life as a whole. How do we 
react when we find him failing to be compassionate when he is in a hurry? Do we 
conclude that his compassion is fine in other, leisurely situations, but unfortunately not 
when he is in a hurry? If so, we would stop expecting him to be compassionate when he 
is in a hurry, and would encourage him to be more reliably compassionate by urging 
him always to avoid being in a hurry. But when we think about this, we can see that it 
makes no sense. Trying to think of a virtue as local, in the way that the situationists do, 
 6 
turns out to run up against important points about what a virtue is. So we need to look 
at what a virtue is, before returning to evaluate the situationists’ attack on it. 
  In what follows, I shall be relying on a broadly acceptable notion of what a 
virtue is, one which comes from what I call ‘the virtue ethics tradition’, which is over 
two thousand years old and has its most famous systematization in Aristotle. Many 
recent theories calling themselves virtue ethics work with thinner notions of virtue. The 
virtue ethics tradition is the best place to look for an account of virtue for two reasons: it 
is a well-worked-out tradition resulting from centuries of debate (whereas some 
modern versions of virtue ethics are making initial moves) and the notion of virtue it 
starts from is the intuitive one found in everyday discourse (whereas some modern 
theories work from notions of virtue which are explicitly theory-based).  
 A virtue, being a character trait or disposition, is built up from habituation, and 
can be called a habit. But in the version of virtue ethics I am defending, it is not a 
mindless habit which bypasses the agent’s practical reasoning. This is because it is a 
disposition to act, exercised through the agent’s practical reasoning.  It is a disposition 
built up as a result of making choices, not a causal deposit within the agent of the effects 
of past behaviour. The difference here can be illustrated by the difference between being 
habitually honest on the one hand, and biting your nails on the other. Further, a virtue 
is a disposition exercised in making choices. When the honest person refrains from 
taking something to which she is not entitled, this is not a reflex, or the predictable 
causal upshot of a habit, but a decision which endorses and strengthens her honesty. 
So the exercise of the agent’s practical reasoning is essential to the way a virtue is 
built up and the way it is exercised.9 There are forms of virtue ethics which deny this 
(ones which stem from Hume and from the utilitarian tradition)  but I think it is clear 
that they are working with a thin, reduced conception of virtue. Julia Driver, who 
defends such a position, calls the classical position ‘intellectualist’ and rejects it on the 
                                                 
9 This point is made in a strangely neglected article by DePaul (1999).  
 7 
grounds that it is ‘elitist’. ‘Virtue must be accessible,’10 she says,meaning that it must be 
open to anybody at any time to be virtuous, while she thinks that it is elitist to require 
virtue to operate through the agent’s practical reasoning, since most people aren’t 
capable of the required practical reasoning. This seems an odd objection to me; surely it 
is more elitist to deny that most people are capable of the reasoning needed to be 
virtuous? I see no reason to deny this, and so no sense in which classical virtue ethics is 
elitist.  
How does the agent’s practical reasoning work? Virtue is the disposition to do 
the right thing for the right reason, in the appropriate way – honestly, courageously, 
and so on. This involves two aspects, the affective and the intellectual.  
The affective aspect of virtue brings in the point that the agent may do the right 
thing and have a variety of feelings about it. She may hate doing the right thing, but do 
it anyway; she may have to struggle with her feelings to do the right thing; she may do 
the right thing effortlessly and with no internal opposition; and so on. Now within 
virtue ethics there is a variety of options on this. Classical virtue ethics always holds 
that doing the right thing readily and without contrary inclination is a mark of the 
virtuous person, as opposed to the one who is merely self-controlled. But different 
theories hold differing positions on the form this takes. Kantian ethics famously 
diverges from classical virtue ethics in holding that virtue is a kind of strength of will to 
do the right thing regardless of your feelings. These are important disputes, but more 
important for the debates at hand is the intellectual side. 
The virtuous agent doesn’t just do the right thing, she does it for the right reason 
– because she understands that this is the right thing to do.11 And she does this 
dispositionally – she has a character such that she understands on each occasion what 
the right thing to do is. How is this understanding built up?  
                                                 
10 Driver (2001), 54. 
11 Within the virtue ethics tradition, there are various ways in which this is further 
explicated. 
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We start our moral education by learning from others, both in making particular 
judgements about what is right and wrong, and in adopting some people as role models 
or teachers. At first, as pupils, we adopt these views because we were told to, or 
because they seemed obvious, and we acquire a collection of moral views which are 
fragmented and accepted on the authority of others. 
 Thus, our moral views may be a mess, and will almost certainly contain 
inconsistencies and gaps. But the learner will not stick there. He will begin to reflect for 
himself on what he has accepted. He will detect and deal with inconsistencies, and will 
try to unify his judgements and practice in terms of wide principles which explain the 
practice and thus enable him to explain and justify the particular judgements he makes. 
This is a process which cannot occur overnight, because it requires experience and 
practice. It is a process which requires the agent at every stage to use his mind, to think 
about what he is doing and to try to achieve understanding of it.  This happens because 
learning is not a purely passive absorption of the views of others but involves an 
aspiration to go beyond these. To recognize that you are a learner is to recognize that 
you have an aspiration to improve. This is encouraged in contexts of good ethical 
education, which gets the pupil to think for herself about what she has been taught. 
To take an example: in many societies the obvious models for courage are macho 
ones, and focus on sports or war stories. A boy may grow up thinking that these are the 
paradigmatic contexts for courage, and have various views about courage and 
cowardice which take this for granted. But if he reflects about the matter, he may come 
to think that he is also prepared to call people in other, quite different contexts brave – a 
child struggling with cancer, someone standing up for an unpopular person or opinion 
in high school, and so on. Further reflection will show that the macho grasp of courage 
was limited and isolated, and will drive him to ask what links all these very different 
cases of bravery. As he comes to understand what bravery is, he becomes more critical 
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of the views that he first was taught, or found obvious, and modifies or rejects some of 
his original judgements and attitudes.12
This development of ethical knowledge proceeds like the acquisition of a 
practical skill or expertise. As Aristotle says, becoming just is like becoming a builder.13 
It’s worth pausing to note how strikingly low-key is this analogy for ethical 
improvement: acquiring a virtue is like acquiring a practical  skill. The point is that 
there is something to learn, something conveyed by teaching. And learning is, as stated, 
not just mindless absorption but involves an aspiration to improve. Learning is a 
process which goes from taking over information or skill from others to making the 
material one’s own, being able to understand, or perform, oneself. The expert is the 
person who has learnt and who as a result comes to reflect on and understand what she 
has been taught, and to think for herself about it.  We are all familiar with the point that 
there are expert mechanics, plumbers and so on. What makes them experts, rather than 
learners, is that they understand what they do. They do not mechanically follow the 
rule-book, but approach each new challenge in a way informed by long practice, but 
ready to respond in creative ways to unfamiliar challenges.  
By this point it has become obvious that we are working with a notion of reason 
which has been excluded from many modern discussions of ethics, and also from much 
modern work in psychology. For this is, precisely, practical reason, the reasoning which 
is exercised in doing something or making something. It is quite obviously not the 
notion of reason common in modern discussions, sometimes labelled ‘Humean’, 
                                                 
12 All forms of virtue ethics which stress this role of practical reasoning move to some 
version of the unity of the virtues. For only a little thought shows that a real 
understanding of honesty, say, can scarcely be achieved in isolation from 
understanding the various factors which may interact with, and affect, an agent’s 
honesty. Honest action is not a safely compartmentalized part of the agent’s life. Thus, 
understanding honesty will turn out to require understanding one’s life as a whole, and 
the relevance of many other factors.  
13 Nicomachean Ethics II 1-3, where many aspects are brought out of the analogy of 
ethical reasoning with the reasoning of the person with a practical skill. Aristotle 
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according to which reason is itself not practical, but merely works out the means to an 
end, while ends are set by desire, which functions independently of reason. I don’t 
intend to argue against this conception here, but merely to make a methodological 
point. Sometimes modern philosophers write as though the ‘Humean’ account of 
reasoning simply gave an account of the way we actually reason, and if you think that, 
then an account of practical reasoning of the sort implied in classical virtue ethics is 
going to look overblown, extravagantly claiming for reason what is, in the ‘Humean’ 
theory, the function of desire. But this is a mistaken account of the matter. Both the 
‘Humean’ account and what I shall call the classical account of practical reasoning, 
which takes the basic model to be that of a practical skill, are theoretical accounts of 
what reason is and how it works. As in many other fields, the actual way we reason is 
imperfect and underdetermines the best theory of it. The classical theory is empirically 
better supported than the ‘Humean’ one in that it does give a good account of many 
areas of practical expertise for which the ‘Humean’ account is pretty unconvincing.14 
But they are both theoretical accounts of practical reasoning. So it would be bad 
methodology to assume the truth of the ‘Humean’ account and fancy that this 
constitutes a criticism of the classical account of practical reasoning.  
Virtue, then, is a disposition to which the agent’s practical reasoning is 
essential.15  And that practical reasoning, as we have seen, has a form whose model is 
that of a practical expertise. Two points need to be stressed, because they are often 
ignored by opponents of virtue ethics. Firstly, practical expertise, including the 
understanding of the virtuous person, is highly situation-sensitive. It is only the 
absolute beginner who does what he does because he has been told to do so, or is 
                                                                                                                                                             
stresses ways in which virtue is unlike skill, but these concern its goals rather than its 
structure.  
14 See my (2001), which develops the classical model of practical knowledge further than 
there is scope to do here. 
15 In this paper I have used the most familiar example, Aristotle’s account of moral 
development, which relies on role-models. However, within the virtue ethics tradition 
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copying the expert, and who acts in a way which is not responsive to the specific 
demands of the situation. As soon as he develops understanding of what he is doing, he 
brings to each situation an understanding of what he should do which has been built up 
by practice, but is active and responsive to what needs to be done now, in this situation. 
Similarly for virtue. Because virtue is a disposition built up from and exercised in 
choices, it is, unlike habit, always sensitive to change and to the new demands of each 
situation. Aristotle says that the virtuous person acts from a settled and unchangeable 
disposition, and this is very often misunderstood –particularly by opponents of virtue 
ethics, as we’ll see. Aristotle doesn’t mean that the virtuous person ploughs on 
regardless of what new situations offer by way of challenge.16 The virtuous person will 
not shift from being honest just because a big temptation offers, for example; so, she is 
reliably honest. But this demands, rather than excluding, her being intelligently 
responsive to the situation. 
Secondly, the reliability of the virtuous character often leads to its being seen as 
static and rigid, a rather uninspiring achievement.  But this is a complete misconception. 
Once we appreciate the role in virtue of the agent’s practical reasoning, we can see that 
virtue ethics emphasises the way that our ethical life is always in a process of 
development. We are all the time dealing with new and complex situations which affect 
not only what we do but how we handle the decisions, as we endorse or modify our 
dispositions in the way we deliberate. The person who is stably and reliably honest is 
not the person who has already completed all her ethical development, but the person 
who brings to the occasion the most developed intelligence and open-mindedness. 
                                                                                                                                                             
there are alternatives, for example the Stoic version, which gives more prominence to 
rules and principles. 
16 He also doesn’t mean that once you have developed a character you can’t change, 
though this is a frequent misunderstanding. He says at Categories 13 a 22 – 31  that the 
bad person can slowly change his character by first acting in a different way, then 
gradually coming to see the point of it. Character change is difficult, given the amount 
of practice needed not just to act well but to become a good person, but it is possible if 
you put in the effort.  
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Let us return to the situationists’ objections to virtue.Virtue and other character 
traits are, they allege, ‘empirically inadequate’ because people who think they have 
such traits surprisingly often fail to act in accordance with them, and do so in ways that 
can be explained by the impact on them of the situation they were in. The immediate 
response is that all this shows is something we already knew, namely that most people 
aren’t virtuous, and they give in to immediate temptations; all the situationists have 
added is that factors we had not suspected, such as being in a hurry, can also get us to 
act in ways that constitute failure of a given trait.  But this response on its own is 
inadequate. Some versions of virtue ethics do take generosity, compassion and so on to 
be possessed only by a very few people, but most have a more complex view which 
rejects this, so that this response alone would in fact undermine the idea that virtue 
ethics does presuppose a realistic psychology.  
What is ‘empirically inadequate’ about the view that we have character traits like 
virtues? The experimenters observed that many subjects in an experiment failed to 
perform the action that the experimenters had predicted that they would perform. The 
result is ‘empirical’ in being a record of behaviour observable by a third party. 
Situationists conclude immediately from failure of behaviour to failure of the virtue, 
since a virtue is supposed to be ‘behaviourially reliable’, where this is taken to mean 
that most people with the virtue will produce the predicted behaviour. 
But, as we have seen at length, a virtue is not a habit of reliably producing 
behaviour of a type independently fixed; it is a disposition to act on reasons of a certain 
kind. What is reliable and steady is the virtuous person’s disposition to act on reasons 
of bravery, generosity and so on. So the honest person will reliably perform honest 
actions, where these are actions done for reasons of a certain kind (for short, reasons of 
honesty). An observer, particularly a scientist setting up an experiment, is recording 
behaviour of a certain kind: picking up money, copying in a test and so on. And there 
are many ways in which this kind of observation may fail to track what is important for 
virtue, namely the kind of reasons acted on.  
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Firstly, the observer and the agent may not be in agreement as to what counts, in 
this situation, as an action of the virtue in question. The observer may count as 
dishonest an action that the agent thought was permissible.17 Given the complexity of 
everyday life, it is unlikely that we will have come up with exhaustive lists of kinds of 
action which are always demanded by a given virtue. Even if we could, life does not 
come compartmentalized, so that in a given situation an action may be demanded by 
honesty, say, but rejected by tact. Every situation presents us with a number of salient 
factors such that even if we knew which actions were demanded by different virtues 
there would still be a problem judging the action performed.  Someone who is reliably 
kind may do a harsh action which we later understand to be kinder than we thought, 
given the whole background. These are all just ways of bringing out the fact that an 
observer does not understand what the agent is actually doing until, and to the extent 
that, the observer has access to the agent’s reasons. This is a familiar fact of everyday 
life, but is somewhat obscured in the situationists’ experiments. 
Still, we may say, there are some cases where it really is clear that this behaviour 
in this situation is relevant to possession, or not, of the virtue. Failing to help the 
stranger in trouble surely showed that most of the Princeton students lacked 
compassion. But this is not so immediately clear. They failed to help. Did they lack the 
right reasons? Not if they had previously been reliably more compassionate; if so, they 
had the right reasons, but these were overridden by haste, or by the self-centred desire 
to give an impressive presentation, or both.18 That some of them at least had the right 
reasons although they did not act on them is shown by later shame and remorse at their 
actions.19 (The same appears to be true of the Milgram subjects, although the facts here 
                                                 
17 Sreenivasan (2002) discusses this sort of phenomenon with regard to an early study of 
schoolchildren.  
18 Situationists assume that the only relevant motivation was the bare fact of being in a 
hurry, but this is implausible; the students were going to give a presentation, and surely 
the desire to come across well played a role, so that here the virtue was competing with 
another character trait, of a more selfish kind, as well as with the impact of the situation.  
19 Campbell (1999) discusses some of the follow-up to the experiment.  
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are very contested in the literature.) Shame is the emotion which reminds the agent, 
unpleasantly, of having acted in a way that they consider wrong, and which urges them 
to act better in future. (It is because shame plays this role of unifying the agent’s life that 
Doris urges that we give it up.) For possession or not of a virtue it is the agent’s reasons 
which matter; this is just a mundane implication of the point that a virtue is a 
disposition to act on a certain kind of reason. There are many ways in which someone 
might have the right kind of reasons but, on a particular occasion, not do so. They 
might be tempted to act otherwise for selfish reasons. They might also be influenced by 
subconscious factors such as being in a hurry, or being in a group. They might be 
muddled, not knowing how to act in this situation. They might be crass or rigid, failing 
to see that this situation demands generosity, or courage.  
These are all ways in which people who fail to act in accordance with a virtue 
might have reasons of a relevant kind, but not bring them to bear in the situation, so 
that their failure to act on that occasion does not show that they lacked the virtue. They 
lack something, though: what is it? They lack the kind of intelligent responsiveness to 
new or unexpected situations which characterizes the virtuous person who is analogous 
to the practical expert. They are like learners – they are learners – because they think too 
rigidly. Their notion of compassion, say, is still derivative from others, or from their 
lessons, and their grasp of it is not intelligent enough to bring it to bear where it is 
required, if there is something unforeseen about the circumstance.  
One main reason for this, though not the only one, is that many people’s concept 
of a virtue is, as already indicated, too tied to a particular kind of situation, often the 
context in which it was acquired or taught. The main problem that the situationists 
point to is that of failure of virtue in cross-situational consistency – but this is not only 
just what you would expect from the  account of virtue I have sketched, it shows how 
that account explains the kind of mistakes we make which include the ‘fundamental 
attribution error’.  We fail to think beyond the contexts in which we have seen someone 
act,  or acted ourselves. We fail to be attentive enough to the situation and context, and 
so get tripped up by factors like being in a hurry. We think that we, or others, are brave, 
 15 
or generous or whatever, but our grasp of this is superficial and conventional; so we can 
fail to act bravely, or generously, when we should, and find that others fail likewise. But 
it is only if we neglect the practical reasoning central to virtue that we will react by 
deeming that the virtues in question do not exist. Our actual response is, in our own 
case, to feel shame and remorse, and resolve to do better. This is not a resolve to 
strategize the situations we are in, trying absurdly, for example, never to be in a hurry. 
Rather, it is a resolve to think more intelligently about what it actually involves to be, 
for example, compassionate. With luck, the situationists’ experiments may have 
shocked some of the subjects into realizing that more thought and work was required 
from them before they could think of themselves as compassionate.20
  
So the situationists’ experiments do not force us to reject virtues as global 
character traits. But perhaps the view that the situationists prefer, namely that we have 
only local character traits, has advantages over the moral psychology of the virtues? We 
aren’t compelled by the facts, as the situationists think, to give up the idea that bravery 
and generosity are global traits, getting us to act in relevantly similar ways across a 
wide variety of types of situation. But maybe it might still be an improvement, from the 
ethical point of view, if we thought of ourselves as having characters that are 
fragmented, rather than robust.  
Doris claims that if I think of myself not as having the global trait of bravery over 
my life as a whole, but rather several local traits, such as bravery-in-situations-of-
physical-danger, lack-of-bravery-in-situations-of-moral-pressure and so on, I will be 
better equipped to meet the dangers of the world, and more sensitive in my moral 
deliberations. He tells the tale of unfortunate person A, who when his spouse is absent 
                                                 
20 These factors are all, of course, much harder for an observer to take account of than 
the easily observable action, which may be one reason why simply observing the action 
has been so over-emphasised in these experiments. An experiment that really tested for 
the presence of a virtue would have to be much more sophisticated, taking into account 
the agent’s reasons (with allowance made for problems with self-reporting, since the 
agent’s own view of the situation would clearly be critical).  
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blunders into seduction by a colleague through relying on strength of character in an 
intimate situation instead of avoiding that situation in the first place. The more 
intelligent and sensitive person B, by contrast, recognizes early danger signals and 
hence manages to avoid the perilous situation. Relying on virtue, Doris claims, is like 
relying on strength of character and the force of habit alone, without recognizing the 
need to evaluate situations and the varying pressures they will predictably bring to 
bear. Only a situationist, who does not think in terms of having an overall character, 
thinking of himself rather in terms of tendencies to respond to different kinds of 
situation, will have the practical intelligence to avert the need for strength of character – 
just as well, if there is no such thing. 
But virtue ethics has never, over more than two thousand years, told us to 
develop characters which will determine our behaviour in fixed and lumpish ways, 
getting us to go ahead blindly without attention to situations. We have seen why this is 
so: virtue is not a matter of mindlessly building up habits, but of developing flexible 
and intelligent responses to the wide variety of complex situations that life faces us 
with. Doris says things like, ‘Our duties may be surprisingly complex, involving not 
simply obligations to particular actions but a sort of “cognitive duty” to attend, in our 
deliberations, to the determinative features of situations’.21  But this is not an indictment 
of virtue ethics, as he supposes it to be. This is something which virtue ethicists can 
cheer all the way; it is something which the virtue ethics tradition has always 
emphasised.  It remains something of a mystery to me why opponents of virtue ethics 
should so persistently represent virtue as a fixed habit built up by mindless repetition.  
 
There is another important implication of the view that we do not have virtues, 
but only local traits. If it is a mistake to think that when faced by a new type of situation 
I will act in a way consistent with my actions in a previous type of situation, then my 
reasons for action will not be consistent over my life as a whole. This is just what Doris 
                                                 
21 p 148 
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holds when he insists that there is no such thing as unified character; we are all 
fragmented selves more like Rameau’s nephew than we like to think.22 Doris claims that 
here again situationism helps us to a better ethical position: we should cease to think of 
the self as an ‘evaluatively integrated “whole”’ and, among other things, stop feeling 
shame, which encourages us to think about our life as a whole, and thus stands in the 
way of moving on and getting a life.23
On this view, thinking in terms of the virtues encourages a stick-in-the-mud 
attitude to life, obsessing over the consistency of our actions, past with present and one 
area of life with another. The better alternative, according to Doris, is to accept that I 
have reasons of one kind for acting in one area of my life, without these having to be 
reasons for acting in other areas, and thus reasons applying over my life as a whole. I 
might act on reasons of one kind at work say, and on quite different reasons at home. 
And this is fine; if we demand more than this we are assuming a false psychology of 
global traits.  
Is this fine? Some reasons bring evaluative commitments with them. Can we 
accept that the values on which we act in one area of life can be values which we regard 
as irrelevant in another? Take an example. Mary treats her colleagues at work with 
respect and courtesy, is collegial and friendly to work with. But she humiliates waiters 
in restaurants, screams at her son’s soccer coach and is demanding and rude to shop 
assistants. Suppose I am a colleague of Mary’s and think that she is a respectful person, 
mindful of the dignity of the people she interacts with. Then one sad day I see her in a 
shop and a restaurant and at the soccer pitch.  If the situationists are right, I have simply 
discovered that Mary is a more complex and interesting person than I suspected; she is 
respectful to colleagues but, intriguingly, not to waiters, shop assistants and soccer 
coaches. Nothing to worry about, and no reason for me to change my attitude to Mary, 
as long as I am confident that henceforth I will encounter her only at work.  
                                                 
22 p. 62-64. 
23 p 160-164, 166. 
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But this is not what happens. Firstly, when I encounter Mary’s rudeness I am 
shocked; when we find people whose behaviour can’t be evaluatively integrated we are 
puzzled, and seek a reason for the breakdown. Secondly, once we see the whole picture 
we don’t just think of Mary as a person who happens to have different reasons in 
different situations; we re-evaluate her reasons in the original situation. If I am Mary’s 
colleague, I cannot now think of her behaviour at work in the same way I did before. I 
now know that she is respectful to people whose opinions she needs to take account of, 
and disrespectful to people whose opinions she can safely ignore. But someone whose 
behaviour is respectful does not have as their reason that they behave respectfully 
because this is someone whose opinion of them matters. Their reason is something like 
that they behave respectfully because everyone deserves to be treated with respect. And 
this is a reason for behaving with respect to the waiters, coach and shop assistants just 
as much as to the colleagues. This is, of course, why we are shocked when we discover 
the rude behaviour to the people that don’t matter to Mary. What we find is that her 
behaviour to her colleagues was not actually respectful at all; the rudeness to waiters 
shows that her behaviour to her colleagues expressed not respect, but hypocrisy or 
deference. She does not, we say, understand what respect really is; for if she did, she 
would make her behaviour in these different areas consistent.  
A situationist might respond that our shock, and re-evaluation, are all just part of 
the same mistake we made in thinking that Mary, or anyone, has a global trait in the 
first place. But note that we now have two explanatory strategies for making sense of 
Mary, and the situationist’s strategy does a bad job by any reasonable standard for 
explanation. For it requires a peculiar dispersal of explanatory factors. We have no 
trouble making sense of Mary (whatever we think about her); but the situationist has to 
explain her behaviour by appealing to facts about soccer pitches, shops and restaurants. 
He seems to have two options: either to admit that we can, whatever we think, actually 
make no sense of Mary, or that we will, despite appearances, find out what it is that 
unifies soccer pitches, shops and restaurants to make them into rudeness-triggers, and, 
moreover, rudeness-triggers just for Mary. Neither option looks very appealing. 
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The situationist may respond that this goes too fast. He may say that we do 
understand Mary without positing a trait that unifies her behaviour. She has developed 
a local trait for work, and three separate local traits for soccer pitches, shops and 
restaurants. As long as we know which kind of situation we are dealing with, we know 
what to expect from Mary. Why is this not enough? 
There are several things that can be said here. Firstly, we have the three separate 
local traits of rudeness-at-soccer-pitches, rudeness-in shops and rudeness-in-
restaurants. Mary seems to be fragmented into a host of mini-traits. And it seems to be 
sheer coincidence that we can unify Mary’s behaviour in shops and restaurants and at 
soccer pitches more easily than we can unify her behavior in any one of these with her 
behaviour at work. On the situationist view, this may even be a mistake; perhaps there 
is no unifying trait of rudeness in all three situations. Certainly the nature of the 
situations offers no explanatory help here. 
Further, so far we have just said that we are shocked by the contrast between 
Mary’s respectful behaviour at work and rudeness elsewhere. What of Mary’s own take 
on this? According to the situationist, Mary should not strive to unify her behaviour 
overall, and so should not strive to recognize relevantly unifying beliefs, such as the 
belief that people at work matter whereas people in shops, etc. don’t. Suppose Mary 
successfully compartmentalizes her own attitudes here, moving between work and 
shops without any attempt to unify her attitudes.  The problem for the situationist here 
is that relevant similarities between people at work and people in shops, etc. are 
sufficiently obvious to any ordinary person that we seem forced to conclude that Mary 
is either very stupid, or is in denial. The latter is more plausible: we think that she 
recognizes that she is treating people differently with insufficient justification (since the 
different situations certainly do not justify the different treatment) but does not want to 
recognize this. For if she did, she would do what we do: feel shock, re-evaluate her 
behaviour at work, and, hopefully, unify her behaviour in the right direction.  
People like Mary do improve. We have just seen what it would take for Mary to 
become respectful rather than rude in shops: integrating her values overall so that there 
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is no unjustifiable difference between her behaviour in shops and her behaviour at 
work.  On the situationist view, the improvement would have to have nothing to do 
with her behaviour at work; it would have to happen independently of that and of her 
behaviour at soccer pitches and in restaurants.  We would just have to hope that she 
had some experiences in shops which had the effect of making her less rude in shops, 
and hope further that similar things happened independently in the other situations. 
But this amounts to giving up on the hope that Mary improves, as opposed to hoping 
that some things happen around Mary. 
 
This kind of example shows that there are deep problems in trying to think of a 
virtue as a merely local trait, and in trying to think of ourselves as having only such 
traits. It turns out to be false that our ethical outlook is improved if we reject the idea 
that a virtue is a global trait, or that we do not need to be evaluatively integrated if we 
are to make sense of ourselves and others.  
Rather, exploring the attacks made on virtue ethics by the situationists turns out 
to show how deep goes the idea that having a virtue is having, and acting on, reasons 
that are operative across your life overall. We run into profound trouble if we try to 
make sense of virtue in any way that denies this. And this is not surprising if we 
remember that virtue ethics has typically been an ethics of character, an ethics where we 
are supposed not just to have virtues in isolation but to do this as part of a project of 
becoming a certain kind of person.  
There have been forms of virtue ethics in which having the virtues has been cut 
off from the project of thinking about our own deliberations and the reasons we have as 
agents. In different ways Hume and the utilitarians have taken a virtue to be no more 
than a disposition which in fact serves to produce something  good – social harmony for 
Hume, some state of affairs for the utilitarians. Nobody owns the term virtue, so we 
cannot reject such theories as theories of virtue. But it is clear that theories like this lose 
the major point of virtue in the mainstream tradition of virtue ethical thinking.  For 
being brave, generous or compassionate is a matter of the kind of person you are; and 
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this matters because it matters ethically what kind of person you are. The different 
virtues, once we start thinking about them rigorously, lead to a character which is 
unified (while remaining, as explained, open and flexible). 
Virtue ethics, then, has no need to fear  modern social psychology. It can go 
further, welcoming and making use of its findings. It has to insist, however, that social 
psychologists interpret virtue properly – not just as a causal explanation of behaviour 
but as a disposition to act on reasons that hold across one’s character as a whole, a 
disposition which needs reference to these reasons as well as to behaviour if we are to 
understand it.  
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